Introduction

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 and the subsequent easing of US sanctions raised hopes regarding Syria’s future trajectory. The country has witnessed the emergence of new civil society initiatives addressing political, social, and cultural issues. Conferences, meetings, workshops, public activities, and grassroots projects have multiplied across Syria, particularly in the capital, Damascus. In addition, protests have increasingly become a visible mode of political expression used to challenge or criticize the new ruling authorities’ socio-economic and political choices.

More than a year later, however, several structural challenges have either emerged or become more pronounced. These include territorial and political fragmentation, foreign influence and military occupation, and rising sectarian tensions.

Syria suffered decades of instrumentalization of sectarianism and primordial identities by the former Syrian regime and specific local opposition actors, as well as regional actors, exacerbated in the post 2011 war context (Daher 2019; Zeno, Nahhas and Nasser 2022). The country’s sectarian and ethnic divisions have, however, in many ways deepened following the fall of the Assad regime and policies of the new ruling authorities, particularly after the massacres in March against Alawite populations in coastal areas resulting in the death of more than 1,400 individuals (Michael 2025; Syrians for Truth and Justice 2026c), attacks against Druze populations in April and May (Ezzi 2025a), and a suicide bombing in a church in Damascus in June 2025 (Syrians for Truth and Justice 2025b). In mid-July 2025, the events of Sweida only worsened the situation, with massive violations of human rights committed notably by armed groups affiliated with, and supportive of central authorities in Damascus (United Nations Human Rights Council 2026).

At the beginning of January 2026, weeks of clashes saw government armed forces advance into the Kurdish-majority neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh in Aleppo, resulting in the displacement of significant segments of the local population (Syrians for Truth and Justice 2026d). These developments culminated in government forces taking control of large areas in the governorates of Deir Ez-Zor and Raqqa following the withdrawal of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). A new agreement was reached on 29 January 2026, providing for the integration of some SDF members into Syrian state institutions (Rudaw 2026a). While Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa publicly affirmed linguistic, cultural, and citizenship rights for Kurdish populations in Syria (SANA 2026a), significant uncertainties remain regarding both the viability of the agreement and its implementation. More broadly, tensions between Arab and Kurdish communities have persisted. For example, Kurdish residents returning from Aleppo to the northern city of Afrin reportedly faced abuse and physical attacks following Newroz celebrations at the end of March 2026, during which the Kurdish flag was burned and trampled. Local authorities subsequently imposed a curfew. Days earlier, footage had circulated showing a group of Kurdish youths removing the Syrian flag in the city of Kobani (Rudaw 2026b).

Violent incidents also occurred in March 2026 in the predominantly Christian city of Al-Suqaylabiyah in the Hama countryside (Seen for Civil Peace 2026b), following earlier sectarian provocations in the area (Syrians for Truth and Justice 2026a).

In early June, new social media campaigns against the Alawite community emerged with clear hate and sectarian speech (the campaign “You Are Not a Tree” (Anta Lasta Shajara)), along with calls to boycott and isolate Alawites, describing as “heretics” and celebrating the revival of Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa against them. Further calls to expel Alawites from cities, and to label the neighbourhoods they inhabit in Homs and Damascus as “settlements” were disseminated (Abdul Rahman 2026). 

These developments have unfolded amid the continued absence of a politically inclusive and democratic transitional process, alongside an increasing concentration of power in the hands of the new Syrian ruling authorities under Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and figures affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). While the authorities in Damascus have expressed willingness to recognize certain confessional and cultural rights of religious and ethnic minorities, and have appointed representatives from Christian, Alawite, Druze, and Kurdish communities to governmental positions, these measures have not fundamentally challenged the concentration of power within the ruling establishment nor ensured meaningful political participation. In parallel, sectarian discourse has become increasingly visible in pro-government media spheres, which critics argue has contributed to an atmosphere in which exclusionary rhetoric and hostile practices have become more normalized.

Hence, this article aims to question how the post-Assad Syrian ruling authorities have used coercion, instrumentalized sectarianism, and selective approaches to justice in their efforts to consolidate centralized rule.

It analyzes how the policies of the Syrian ruling authorities toward religious and ethnic minorities relate to broader efforts to centralize and consolidate power in Damascus. First, it examines the use of force as a key strategy in the consolidation of centralized authority. Second, it explores how official and pro-government media have contributed to the construction of discourses that misrepresent minorities, instrumentalize sectarian narratives, and promote a purportedly homogeneous “Arab Sunni” political identity. Finally, the article analyzes how the absence of accountability and meaningful transitional justice mechanisms has contributed to the deterioration of civil peace in the country.

To analyze these dynamics, this article adopts a materialist approach. This analytical perspective, largely inspired by critical and Marxist traditions, provides a theoretical framework for examining political and socio-economic reconfiguration in Syria, including the evolving relations between the ruling authorities and the country’s minority communities.

Within this framework, particular attention is paid to the processes through which a new ruling class constructs political domination and the mechanisms through which this domination is maintained. Adam Hanieh (2013) argues that political institutions are historically shaped, and reflect class structures formed through processes of capital accumulation. In this perspective, the state cannot be understood as separate from the political and economic relations that structure society. Similarly, the state may be understood as a social relation, or as “the set of institutional forms through which the ruling class interacts with the rest of society,” as Bertell Ollman explains (cited in Hanieh 2013, 14). The relationship between the ruling class and state institutions contributes to the constitution and reproduction of class power; state and class formation therefore reinforce and shape one another, whereby class determines the conditions of existence of the state. The Syrian ruling authorities’ management of, and relations with minority communities are examined through this analytical lens.

Antonio Gramsci’s work on hegemony (Gramsci 1999; Thomas 2009) offers further insight into the internal dynamics of power and the relationship between ruling groups and different sectors of society. Gramsci argues that domination does not rest solely on coercion, but also on the capacity of a social group to generate forms of cultural and political consent that normalize its leadership. When authority must rely predominantly on violence and repression to sustain itself, hegemonic legitimacy becomes fragile or incomplete. In such contexts, the state is characterized as backward and tends to rely more heavily on coercive mechanisms while exercising only limited hegemony over society.

One of the mechanisms through which the Syrian ruling authorities have sought to construct a degree of popular consent among segments of the Arab Sunni population has been the instrumentalization of sectarianism. Within this framework, sectarianism is understood as a modern political phenomenon (Amel 1986; Makdisi 2000), rather than as a remnant of pre-modern history preventing advancement or an essential characteristic inherent to the peoples of the region (see Valbjørn and Hinnebusch 2019). In the 1980s, in the midst of the Lebanese Civil War, the Lebanese Marxist thinker Mahdi Amel (1986: 323, 326–327) refuted attempts to mechanically associate class position with membership in a particular religious sect. Instead, he emphasized the dialectical  class composition of sectarian communities and argued that sectarianism functions in part to obscure relations of domination and inequality within the community itself. More broadly, Amel’s approach to sectarianism (1986: 248) highlights its contemporary political function in structuring power relations between classes within Arab societies shaped by colonialism. In this sense, he opposed what he termed “historicist” perspectives, which treat sectarianism as a primordial vestige destined to disappear through modernization. Rather, Amel viewed sectarianism as embedded within and reinforcing contemporary forms of state and class power.

Similarly, the Lebanese-Palestinian scholar Ussama Makdisi (2000: 2–7) explains that sectarianism should be understood as a modern historical formation that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century. Makdisi aptly demonstrates how sectarian identities developed within the broader context of European colonial influence and Ottoman reform processes, and how actors operating at colonial (European), imperial (Ottoman), and local (Lebanese) levels mobilized historical narratives in order to legitimize their contemporary political projects and visions of future development.

A broader body of literature emerged following the uprisings that began in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, examining the use of identity politics and the instrumentalization of sectarianism by authoritarian regimes seeking to consolidate power, as well as by opposition actors attempting to mobilize specific constituencies (Achcar 2013; Hashemi and Postel 2017; Valbjørn and Hinnebusch 2019; Valbjørn 2019).

Damascus’ Centralization of Power: Coercion as a Primary Strategy

In mid-August 2025, following the events in Sweida, Syrian Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa declared that the reunification of Syria after years of civil war should not be achieved “through military force” (L’Orient-Le Jour and AFP 2025). Nevertheless, the Syrian ruling authorities have largely pursued a strategy of consolidating power through military and security means, particularly in regions with significant religious and ethnic minority populations, rather than through sustained political dialogue.

This dynamic was particularly visible during the sectarian violence unleashed against Alawite civilians in March 2025. While military operations by armed groups affiliated with Damascus were initially triggered by coordinated attacks carried out by remnants of the former Assad regime against members of the security services and civilians, the subsequent response reportedly extended beyond those directly involved in the attacks and targeted broader segments of the Alawite population. According to several reports, acts of violence were accompanied by sectarian rhetoric and framed through narratives of revenge.

Various human rights organizations and investigative reports have argued that the Syrian authorities bear significant responsibility for the March 2025 massacres. These reports contend that state institutions failed to prevent the violence, while some armed groups affiliated with the authorities were allegedly directly implicated in abuses. Investigations by Reuters (Michael 2025) and Human Rights Watch (2025b) further suggested that higher echelons of the state apparatus were aware of and even approved the ongoing violations. More broadly, critics have argued that the political and security environment created by the ruling authorities contributed to the conditions in which such violence became possible.

Armed groups affiliated with the government were implicated in the Fahil massacre at the end of December 2024 (Syrians for Truth and Justice 2025a) and the Arzah massacre at the beginning of February 2025 (The New Arab 2025a). These violent incidents preceded the coastal massacres of March 2025 and were perceived by some observers as indicative of escalating sectarian violence.

Similarly, sectarian attacks against Druze populations in Damascus and in the southern governorate of Sweida occurred in April and May 2025, prior to the massacres of mid-July. According to researcher Mazen Ezzi (2025b), the military offensive led by armed groups affiliated with Damascus was prepared both militarily and politically through “efforts to build military and security groups affiliated with the ‘Transitional Administration’ inside Sweida, as well as political groundwork aimed at penetrating the governorate by courting social leaders, religious figures, and politicians.”

The military assault on Sweida occurred after discussions in Baku, Azerbaijan, between Syrian and Israeli representatives. During these talks, the Syrian ruling authorities allegedly requested Tel Aviv’s approval for the return of Sweida under Damascus’ control. According to Syria in Transition (2025), while Israeli officials reportedly expressed openness to limited reintegration — namely, the restoration of state services and the deployment of a limited local security force — Damascus interpreted this as authorization for a broader military operation. Israel subsequently bombed Syrian armed forces during the latter stages of the attack on Sweida.

Despite ongoing talks between Damascus and Tel Aviv, Israel has maintained an aggressive posture toward Syria. In the days following the fall of the Assad regime, Israel expanded its occupation of territories on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon and the Golan Heights. It also carried out hundreds of airstrikes targeting military sites and infrastructure, including anti-aircraft batteries, military airfields, weapons production facilities, fighter jets, and missiles. These operations aimed to cripple Syria’s military capabilities and prevent their potential future use against Israel, while also signaling that the Israeli army retained the capacity to destabilize the situation should the new government adopt a hostile or belligerent stance toward Israel. Tel Aviv has continued to conduct strikes and military operations in southern Syria, resulting in what Syrian officials described as “attacks on civilians, including raids, arrests, land bulldozing, and the use of mortar and artillery shelling” (SANA 2026c).

More broadly, Israeli policies toward Syria have been widely perceived as aimed at maintaining the country in a weakened and fragmented state. In this context, Tel Aviv has relied not only on military superiority, but also on political strategies that exploit sectarian tensions, including engagement with particular military and political actors in an attempt to weaken the central state and create instability in the country.

Regardless of whether Israeli approval was granted, the Syrian authorities’ decision to engage militarily in Sweida reflected a tendency to rely on external validation and support in pursuing certain policies, including coercive measures against local populations, rather than prioritizing political engagement to resolve the issue.

Seen from this perspective, the military campaign against Sweida aimed at consolidating full control over the governorate and marginalizing Druze political actors unwilling to submit to Damascus’ authority. Meanwhile, the authorities promoted Druze actors who, despite having limited influence or popularity, were willing to align with government interests, including Layth al-Balaous, Suleiman Abdul Baqi, and other local figures. According to Ezzi (2025b), some of these personalities had prior relations with HTS and received increased visibility in official and pro-government media.

In a similar fashion, the military offensive led by government armed forces in January 2026 resulted in the capture of the Kurdish-majority neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh in Aleppo, followed by the takeover of large parts of the governorates of Deir Ez-Zor and Raqqa, and subsequent failed negotiations. Damascus’ offensive in Aleppo, as well as in other SDF-controlled areas, took place after the expiration of the 31 December 2025 deadline stipulated in the 10 March 2025 agreement. Brokered by Washington between Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi, head of the SDF, the agreement sought to integrate both the civilian and military wings of the SDF into state institutions. However, the political deadlock persisted.

In this case, foreign backing appeared to play an important role in the offensive, which took place two days after a meeting in Damascus between the Syrian Transitional Government (STG) and the SDF in the presence of U.S. military personnel. With negotiations stalled, Washington and Ankara either approved the operation or did not oppose it. While the United States and France officially claimed to support de-escalation efforts between the STG and the SDF, they did not exert meaningful pressure to halt the government’s military assault. Despite Washington’s long-standing partnership with the SDF in the fight against ISIS, the U.S. administration ultimately supported the authorities in Damascus. This reflected broader political developments following the fall of the Assad regime and the rapprochement between Damascus and Washington throughout 2025. U.S. President Donald Trump met several times with Interim President al-Sharaa and lifted the Caesar sanctions in December 2025. U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack made this position explicit when he declared that the SDF’s role as the “primary anti-ISIS force on the ground” had “largely expired,” arguing that the Syrian government was now capable of assuming such security responsibilities. He added that “Historically, the U.S. military presence in northeastern Syria was justified primarily as a counter-ISIS partnership,” and argued that the STG’s decision to join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in late 2025 had “fundamentally” transformed the situation in Syria (Al-Jazeera Staff 2026).

On the Turkish side, Ankara continuously pressured the SDF following the fall of the Assad regime to dissolve and integrate into the Syrian army. Turkish officials also repeatedly expressed willingness to support, and even fight alongside, STG forces against the SDF (Iddon 2026).

Meanwhile, prior to the latest discussions in Paris, the Syrian government was reportedly developing a plan to launch a military operation first in Aleppo and then extend it to other SDF-controlled areas. In this context, Damascus mobilized various Arab tribes in Deir Ez-Zor and Raqqa, which had reportedly been in contact with Interim President al-Sharaa for some time, in preparation for operations against the SDF.

These examples reflect a broader tendency to favor military confrontation, often with foreign backing or acquiescence, in order to achieve political gains and consolidate power in Damascus. The reliance on coercion as a preferred instrument of rule also reflects the limited degree of hegemony exercised by the authorities over society. In this context, the instrumentalization and mobilization of sectarian and ethnic identities become important political tools for rallying some sectors of the population while marginalizing others.

Misrepresentation of Minorities and the Construction of a Purported Homogeneous “Arab Sunni” Political Identity

Certain Syrian officials and pro-government media outlets have not hesitated to misrepresent various religious and ethnic minorities in their efforts to consolidate power. Pro-government media frequently promoted narratives portraying minorities, or groups such as the SDF, as “separatists” and/or as attempting to create “an alliance of minorities” against “the Sunni majority.” Sectarian rhetoric has been particularly pronounced during periods of military offensives led by Damascus, at times adopting openly aggressive tones.

For instance, some officials and commentators described the Alawite community as a tool of the former regime against the Syrian people. During his speech at the ninth edition of the donors’ conference on Syria in Brussels, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani stated that “54 years of minority rule led to the displacement of 15 million Syrians...” (Al-Arabiya 2025), implicitly suggesting that the Alawite community as a whole had ruled the country for decades, rather than a dictatorship centered around the Assad family. While Alawite figures undeniably occupied key positions within the former regime, particularly in the military and security apparatus, reducing the nature of the Syrian state and its dominant institutions to an “Alawite identity,” or portraying the regime as favoring religious minorities while systematically discriminating against the Sunni Arab majority, is misleading and does not accurately reflect the complexity of the regime’s structures and social base (Daher 2018).

In November 2025, segments of the Alawite community protested against the violations they had experienced since the fall of Assad. Protesters called for greater security, particularly in response to ongoing killings and kidnappings, especially of women. They also raised demands related to federalism, denounced what they viewed as disproportionate and arbitrary dismissals from state institutions, and criticized deteriorating living conditions (Daher 2025). While describing some of the protesters’ broader demands as “legitimate,” Interim President al-Sharaa focused primarily on the calls for federalism, associating them with “separation” and describing them as “an expression of political ignorance” serving narrow interests (Middle East Monitor 2025). At the same time, large rallies in support of the ruling authorities were organized in several cities. Although these demonstrations were officially presented as mobilizations “against division” and in support of national unity, numerous sectarian slogans and chants were reported among participants (The New Arab 2025b; Syrians for Truth and Justice 2026a).

Similarly, Druze populations were portrayed by some officials and pro-government media outlets as “traitors,” “armed gangs allied with Israel,” and “separatists” (Khatt 30 2025), particularly following the massacres of July 2025 (Massoud 2025). The military operations carried out by armed groups affiliated with Damascus in mid-July 2025 reportedly targeted Druze civilians indiscriminately and included multiple acts of humiliation directed at civilians and Druze religious symbols (United Nations Human Rights Council 2026).

The terrorist attack against Mar Elias Church in the Dweilaa neighborhood of Damascus in June 2025 also occurred within what Syrians for Truth and Justice (2025b) described as “a broader pattern of violations targeting Christian citizens in Syria.” In addition, Syrian officials faced criticism for not referring to the victims as “martyrs,” a term commonly used in Syria in relation to such attacks. Instead, the presidential statement employed more generic expressions such as “those who perished in the bombing of Mar Elias Church” and “innocent civilians” (Syrians for Truth and Justice 2025b). Some critics interpreted this terminology as reflecting sectarian bias because the victims were Christians.

Alongside human rights violations against Kurdish civilians in Aleppo and the northeast, the military offensive against the SDF in January 2026 was also accompanied by aggressive rhetoric targeting Kurds, accusing them of separatism and, at times, calling for violence against them. For example, Syria’s Minister of Endowments, Mohammad Abu al-Khair Shukri, issued a religious directive in January 2026 urging mosques across the country to pray for the success of the Syrian Arab Army’s soldiers and celebrate what he described as their “conquests and victories” in eastern Syria. He also invoked the sixth verse of Surah al-Anfal from the Quran (Rudaw 2026a). The term “al-Anfal” carries heavy historical connotations, as it was used by Saddam Hussein to justify the 1988 military campaign against Kurds in Iraq, which included chemical attacks, mass killings, and the destruction of civilian homes and infrastructure.

In parallel, human rights violations against Kurdish populations in the region of Afrin and its surrounding areas have continued. These abuses were committed by armed factions formerly operating under the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), which were integrated into the Syrian army following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. A report by the human rights organization Syrians for Truth and Justice (2026e) documented ongoing “patterns of torture and inhuman treatment,” as well as what it described as “a systematic policy of discrimination against Kurdish residents, in which the ‘ready-made accusation’ of affiliation with Kurdish entities or involvement in the structures of the former self-administration was used to justify arrest and torture.” The report added that these accusations were “often accompanied by degrading rhetoric and ethnically charged insults, indicating that the violations specifically targeted Kurds on the basis of their identity.”

In addition to the misrepresentation of religious and ethnic minorities, the Syrian ruling authorities and their supporters have sought to promote a so-called common Arab Sunni political identity around themes such as “Banu Umayya” (“the Umayyad people”) (Al-Abdeh 2025; Abd Alatef 2026). Closely linked to this is the narrative of the “Mazlumiya Sunniya” (“Sunni victimhood” or “Sunni injustice”), which constructs an image of systemic discrimination against Arab Sunnis under the previous regime (Daher 2018), and promotes the idea that “the time of Arab Sunnis to rule has come.” This narrative appears aimed at generating popular support and unifying broad segments of the Arab Sunni population despite important political and socio-economic differences within these constituencies.

Sectarianism as a political tool fundamentally serves to consolidate power and divide society. It can function to divert attention from socio-economic and political issues by scapegoating a particular group — defined through sectarian or ethnic identity — as the source of the country’s problems and as a security threat, thereby legitimizing discriminatory or repressive policies against it. Moreover, sectarianism acts as a mechanism of social control by shaping class relations and reinforcing forms of dependence between popular classes and elite leaderships. As a result, popular classes may lose forms of independent political agency and instead become politically mobilized primarily through sectarian identities (Amel 1986). Similarly, Pinto (2017: 124) defines sectarianism as the “political mobilization of religious differences as a framework for the distribution of rights, privilege, and/or violence among a certain population.”

In this context, the new authorities appear in several respects to reproduce patterns associated with the former Assad regime, notably through the continued use of sectarian policies and practices as instruments of governance, control, and social division (Batatu 1998; Seurat 2012).

This dynamic has been reinforced by the absence of an inclusive and democratic political transition capable of reflecting and channeling the political demands of broad sectors of the population. This has been evident in various initiatives, conferences, and committees intended to shape the country’s future. For example, the Syrian National Dialogue Conference held on 25 February 2025 was criticized for its lack of preparation and limited representation. The interim constitution, signed by the interim Syrian president, also faced criticism from various political and social actors, both regarding the lack of transparency in the selection criteria for the drafting committee and concerning its content (Human Rights Watch 2025a). Furthermore, although the interim constitution formally declares a separation of powers, critics argued that this principle is undermined by the broad powers granted to the presidency.

Similarly, key positions within the transitional government have been occupied by figures close to Interim President al-Sharaa, including his two brothers, Maher and Hazem, both of whom previously held important positions within the HTS power structure in Idlib before the overthrow of the Assad regime in December 2024. For example, Asaad al-Shibani and Abu Qasra retained their positions as foreign minister and defense minister, while the ministries of interior, energy, and justice remained under the control of HTS members or political allies of the interim president. The transitional government included four ministers from ethnic or religious minority backgrounds, including one woman.

The People’s Assembly “elections” in October 2025 also drew widespread criticism, specifically for its methodology and procedures used to select members of the future parliament deemed as lacking transparency and inclusivity. In addition, Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa retained the authority to appoint one-third of the members of parliament, while the remaining two-thirds were selected by “regional subcommittees,” themselves appointed by the Higher Committee for the Election of the People’s Assembly, whose members had been selected by the presidency. It should also be noted that, although seats were filled in the governorate of Raqqa following its reintegration under Damascus’ authority in January 2026, no representatives had yet been appointed for al-Hasakah and Kobani in Aleppo governorate — though Syrian officials stated that preparations for such appointments were underway (SANA 2026b) — nor for Sweida in the Druze-majority south, which remained outside state control.

More generally, the ruling authorities have taken measures to strengthen their control over society, including efforts that critics argue restrict democratic rights. The Foreign Ministry established the General Secretariat for Political Affairs (GSPA) at the end of March 2025 to supervise domestic political activities, formulate general policies related to political affairs, and manage the assets of the dissolved Baath Party. The Syrian Ministry of Tourism issued a circular in November 2025 requesting tourist establishments to refrain from hosting political events or conferences without prior approval from the GSPA (Al-Daleel 2025). In early May 2026, Syria’s Interior Ministry introduced new regulations concerning “the licensing of peaceful demonstrations, outlining procedures for organizers, responsibilities of authorities, and penalties for violations” (SANA 2026d). While state officials declared that these decisions were intended “not to restrict freedoms but rather to regulate them,” human rights activists criticized several aspects of the measures, including the reintroduction of a permit system similar to that used under the Assad regime, extensive bureaucratic requirements such as the formation of organizing committees, the requirement to obtain permits rather than simply notify authorities, vague criteria enabling the authorities to prohibit protests, and penalties reaching up to two years in prison under the Syrian Penal Code (Megaphone 2026).

Informal networks have reportedly expanded through the creation of “administrative sheikhs” and other secret committees within ministries and state institutions in order to manage key sectors, including security, finance, foreign policy, and internal administration, often with limited bureaucratic oversight from formal state institutions (The Syria Report 2025).

The Syrian ruling authorities also established new economic institutions that concentrated significant powers within the presidency, including the Higher Council for Economic Development, the sovereign wealth fund, the development fund, and the Syrian Petroleum Company. In each case, important powers and responsibilities were concentrated within the presidency, while oversight and accountability mechanisms remained limited, particularly in the absence of a functioning parliament (Daher 2026a). Additional institutions were also placed under the authority of the General Secretariat of the Presidency, until recently headed by Maher al-Sharaa, brother of the interim president. These included the General Authority for Supply and Procurement (GASP), responsible for managing internal and external procurement for state institutions, including oversight of high-value contracts, as well as the National Committee for Import and Export, which oversees import and export activities.

In this context, sectarianism functions as a political tool through which the authorities seek to construct a so-called homogeneous Sunni bloc while downplaying democratic demands and transcending socio-economic and regional divisions. The instrumentalization of sectarian and ethnic identities also serves to neutralize dissent and mobilize segments of the population against particular groups, diverting attention from growing socio-economic and political grievances (Daher 2026b) and contributing to broader social fragmentation.

No Accountability and No Transitional Justice: Threatening Civil Peace

In February 2026, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani declared that “there is no violence against minorities in Syria. There are problems with armed groups that are outside the law and outside the framework of the state” (The National 2026). However, as discussed above, violence has also affected civilians, including members of religious minorities, and the issue has not been limited solely to armed groups operating “outside the law and outside the framework of the state.”

Syrian authorities have so far failed to establish a mechanism promoting a comprehensive transitional justice process aimed at holding accountable all individuals and groups implicated in war crimes during the Syrian conflict. Such an approach could have played an important role in limiting acts of revenge and reducing rising sectarian and ethnic tensions. Syrian human rights organizations have criticized the authorities’ inaction on this issue. They notably denounced Decree No. 20, promulgated on 17 May 2025, which established the National Transitional Justice Commission (NTJC). The commission was tasked with investigating serious violations attributed to the former Assad regime, while excluding violations committed by other actors during the conflict. Critics argued that this logic of selective justice contradicted principles of equality and non-discrimination and excluded a large number of victims from its mandate. Moreover, these organizations accused the new authorities, through this decree, of contributing to a “culture of impunity, allowing armed groups and forces still operating independently or under the aegis of the Ministry of Defense to continue to commit serious violations, including extrajudicial executions, abductions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, extortion and sexual violence” (Syrian Justice and Accountability Center 2025b).

For their part, the ruling authorities repeatedly described sectarian acts as isolated incidents while taking limited action against their main perpetrators, despite establishing investigation committees to examine crimes committed in the coastal areas and in Sweida, and despite the opening of a first trial in Aleppo in mid-November prosecuting both loyalists of the former regime and members of the new security forces for human rights violations committed in the coastal areas in March 2025. However, in mid-February 2026, Interim President al-Sharaa issued an amnesty decree covering crimes committed prior to its promulgation, a move criticized for undermining prospects for transitional justice and accountability (Al-Adawi 2026b).

The city of Homs has become emblematic of the persistence of sectarian violence and impunity. The grassroots organization Seen for Civil Peace (2026a) described the situation in Homs as representing “a dangerous and ongoing pattern of lawlessness and blatant sectarian targeting, for which the political and security leadership in the governorate bears direct responsibility, by virtue of their legal mandate and de facto authority on the ground.” Between January and February 2026, the organization’s Documentation and Studies Department documented the killing of 30 civilians and the injury of 38 others in Homs governorate in incidents linked to sectarian dynamics, out of a total of around documented cases since the beginning of 2025. This occurred alongside reports of property seizures in Homs targeting Alawite individuals (Mahfoud, Al-Omar, and Shullar 2026). Other regions with Alawite populations have also witnessed violations of human rights against them, such as land grabs and occupation of homes belonging to displaced Alawi farmers in Hama’s countryside by Sunni neighbours under the administration of a state company called Iktifaa, based in northwestern Idlib province with around 500 employees (Danon 2026).  

Additionally, the absence of transitional justice did not prevent arrangements with former Assad-era officials accused of involvement in crimes and human rights violations, including National Defense Forces commander Fadi Saqr and Republican Guard General Talal Makhlouf. According to the Syrian Justice and Accountability Center (2025a), these individuals secured “settlements” or agreements with the new ruling authorities that allowed them “to continue living normally in Syria without fear of arrest or retribution.”

Moreover, transitional justice efforts in post-Assad Syria have failed to address issues such as economic crimes and gender-based violence. Despite several reports and articles documenting or denouncing “targeted abductions, disappearances, and gender-based violence against women and girls, particularly from the Alawite community” (United Nations Human Rights Council 2025; Syrians for Truth and Justice 2026b), Syrian officials repeatedly denied the existence of such patterns. In July 2025, the Syrian Interior Ministry established a special investigative committee to examine kidnapping allegations and missing-person complaints. The committee presented its findings during a conference in November 2025, concluding that it had found no evidence of systematic kidnappings targeting any segment of Syrian society (SANA 2025).

Similarly, the socio-economic dimension of a comprehensive transitional justice process has largely been ignored by the authorities and has also remained largely absent from the public discourse of human rights organizations, civil society groups, and political parties. In a report published in 2025, UN Special Rapporteur Bernard Duhaime emphasized the need to promote “the intersection of transitional justice and economic, social and cultural rights” for states “transitioning from conflict or authoritarian rule… when negotiating, designing and implementing transitional justice processes” (United Nations 2025). The Special Rapporteur further argued that “gross violations of economic, social and cultural rights should be identified, acknowledged, analysed and documented by truth commissions and other truth-seeking mechanisms. To ensure their efficiency, these bodies must be given the mandate, capacity and resources required for the fulfilment of their tasks” (United Nations 2025).

Within the academic literature on transitional justice (see Sharp 2019), some authors, such as Gready and Robins (2014), have argued in favor of a transformative justice approach rooted in a long-term perspective emphasizing “holistic social justice, local agency and participation, and the social and political rather than the legal dimensions of social change.” Others, such as Franzki and Olarte (2014), went further by arguing that “a truly revolutionary approach to transitional justice might go beyond even the social democratic and transformative visions to include large-scale redistribution of wealth, the democratic control of the economy, and people’s courts that pursue both direct perpetrators and indirect beneficiaries of the previous regime, including bystanders.”

In the Syrian case, instead of prosecuting businessmen connected to the former Assad regime and implicated in major financial and economic crimes, the ruling authorities reached various forms of reconciliation agreements with several of them. These agreements included prominent figures affiliated with Assad’s inner circle, such as Mohammad Hamsho, historically a close ally and frontman of Maher al-Assad; Samir Hassan, known for his role in the regime’s opaque financial networks; Issam Shammout, owner of Cham Wings, Syria’s only private airline (now renamed Fly Cham); and Salim Daaboul, owner of at least 25 companies and son of Mohammad Deeb Daaboul, who served as Hafez al-Assad’s personal secretary for 40 years. No legal proceedings were initiated against these individuals for economic crimes, nor were mechanisms established to recover their wealth for the state and its citizens. In return, these businessmen reportedly agreed to relinquish part of their fortunes (Al-Adawi 2026a).

For instance, the National Committee for Combating Illicit Gains (2026), established in May 2025, announced on 7 January a settlement agreement with businessman Mohammad Hamsho, under its recently launched Voluntary Disclosure Program. In a statement published on its official website, the committee declared that the agreement followed “extensive investigations” and examinations of assets and financial declarations aimed at ensuring property transparency and achieving economic justice. According to the statement, the Voluntary Disclosure Program allows the settlement of legal and tax status “without prejudice to the state’s rights or departure from the legal framework.” The commission stated that the program applies to individuals able to demonstrate that their wealth was acquired through lawful means. It further argued that the initiative sought to enhance transparency in the economic environment, encourage investment, protect the national economy from illicit gains, and restore the state’s financial rights (National Committee for Combating Illicit Gains 2026).

However, the transitional authorities did not establish a transparent process regarding these reconciliation agreements, including concerning the proportion of wealth relinquished by these businessmen or the allocation of the recovered funds.

The current process of transitional justice in Syria therefore remains limited both in the categories of individuals targeted and in its broader political orientation, while also failing to adopt a long-term, participatory, and holistic approach to justice that strengthens local agency.

Conclusion

Following the massacres in Sweida, Interim President al-Sharaa stated in July 2025 that Israel’s actions undermined Syrian unity and weakened the state. While the Israeli government has indeed sought to exploit divisions within Syria for its own political interests, the policies pursued by the Syrian ruling authorities also contributed to the conditions that enabled such foreign interventions, and worsened the fragmentation of the country.

Syria inherited profound political, social, and economic challenges. The Assad regime, alongside local and regional actors and dynamics, fostered sectarianism across multiple aspects of Syrian society. However, rather than challenging these dynamics, the new ruling authorities have in several respects reproduced them.

Among broad segments of religious and ethnic minorities, including Alawites, Druze, Christians, and Kurds, mistrust has remained widespread in the post-Assad period. Many have expressed concerns regarding the protection of their rights and the possibility that the transition could lead to a new form of authoritarian rule (ETANA 2025; Al-Shami and Robbins 2025).

Government attempts to “accomplish” national unity and sovereignty have relied largely on military action rather than political dialogue and inclusion involving different sectors of society, including religious and ethnic minorities. These approaches have been criticized for exacerbating instability and division within the country.

More broadly, the government’s relations with, and treatment of religious and ethnic minorities reflect its failure to establish the foundations of an inclusive and democratic transitional phase, capable of promoting security in its broader sense, including the protection of freedoms, access to basic services, and the safeguarding of civil and political rights.

More fundamentally, the authorities cannot justify policies adopted in the name of unity and sovereignty solely through coercive capacity and the imposition of the “state’s monopoly of violence.” Such an approach overlooks the institutional, social, and economic conditions necessary for sustaining political authority.

The absence of a comprehensive transitional justice process has raised concerns regarding civil peace and sectarian tensions in several areas.

The new Syrian ruling elite continues to rely primarily on coercive methods to govern, including military operations, domination over state institutions, tighter control over society, and the instrumentalization of sectarian and ethnic differences. In fact, it appears to exercise only limited hegemony over society, reflected in its reluctance to pursue an inclusive transition process or to seek broader internal legitimacy through participatory approaches and the integration of wider segments of society into decision-making processes.

In conclusion, the issue of minorities in Syria is not simply a question of symbolic representation within state institutions, minority-specific rights, or the promotion of a “more tolerant society,” but is fundamentally linked to the broader question of Syria’s democratization. Numerous initiatives and public discussions in Syria have emphasized the importance of education, dialogue between sectarian and ethnic groups, and the development of a more inclusive historical narrative in order to strengthen civil peace and counter sectarian dynamics. These efforts are important and should indeed be encouraged. However, they do not directly challenge the underlying political structures that produce and reproduce sectarian practices and forms of political domination within society. Human agency remains shaped, though not wholly determined, by broader social and political structures. As Antonio Gramsci (1999: 207) argued, “subaltern groups are always subject to the activity of ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up: only permanent victory breaks their subordination, and that not immediately.”

Challenging sectarian dynamics is therefore closely linked to broader political struggles against authoritarianism and in favor of democracy, social justice, and equality.

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